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Vicarious Liability for Mine Safety and
Health Violations
WILLIAM K. DORAN*
Unlike the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 does not regulate employers.
Instead, the Act focuses on the "operator" of the mine in designat-
ing responsibility for the safety and health of miners. That the oper-
ator is responsible for health and safety at the mine is a fact which
is universally understood and accepted within the mining industry.
However, the issue of who that operator is for federal enforcement
purposes is still very unclear throughout the industry and has be-
come a major point of contention between the industry and the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).
In the past few years, MSHA, citing statistical evidence that the
number of independent contractor employees in the mining industry
- and accidents involving such employees - have dramatically
increased, has changed its traditional enforcement emphasis. In the
past, MSHA held the operator in direct and immediate control of
day-to-day operations responsible for its own violations. MSHA has
broadened responsibility to every entity that falls within the Mine
Act definition of "operator," including owners and lessees, regard-
less of their involvement in the mine. While MSHA argues that it
has always had this authority, the enforcement reality has never
reflected that fact. That reality has now changed.
. B.A. 1985, University of Virginia; J.D. 1988, Catholic University. The author is
currently a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Smith, Heenan and Althen. Mr.
Doran represents and advises companies with respect to issues arising under the Mine
Safety and Health Act, the Occupationil Safety and Health Act and the various state
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I. THE EvOLUTION OF THE "OPERATOR"
A. Direct and Immediate Control Under the 1969 Coal Act
The enforcement and regulatory focus on the "operator" had its
genesis in the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (1969 Coal
Act). The 1969 Coal Act defined the term "operator" as "any owner,
lessee, or other person who operates, controls or supervises a coal
mine."' With respect to assigning responsibility for the safety and
health requirements of the mine as a whole, this term was consis-
tently applied under the 1969 Coal Act to designate the individual,
partnership, or corporation in direct and immediate control of the
mine on a day-to-day basis.
While there was never a question under the 1969 Coal Act that
the operator in direct and immediate control of the mine as a whole
was responsible for meeting the overall safety and health require-
ments associated with the actual mining process, a logical question
did arise over the responsibility of independent service and construc-
tion contractors. Such contractors, who bring special construction
and service expertise, in many cases supervise and control their own
employees in the performance of their particular task. Consequently,
there was a contention that these contractors were in direct and
immediate control of this work and were better able to insure com-
pliance with mandatory safety and health requirements. In turn, it
was argued that these contractors should also bear sole responsibility
for violations of those requirements.
This issue was squarely addressed in Affinity Mining Company'
by the Interior Board of Mining Appeals. In Affinity, the Board
affirmed an Administrative Law Judge's decision that the mine
operator should not be cited for violations committed by a construc-
tion contractor who was in direct and immediate control of the
construction project.3 The Board also rejected the Administrative
' Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 § 3(d), 30 U.S.C. § 801
(1969).
2 Affinity Mining Co., 2 I.B.M.A. 63 (1972), affd as modified, 2 I.B.M.A. 57
(1973).
I ld. (citing how the mine operator contracted a construction contractor, Cowin
Construction Co., to extend an existing slope into a new coal seam in order to reopen a
closed mine. The slope work was conducted and supervised by Cowin personnel. Design
modifications to the slope project were required to be approved by an Affinity engineer
who was overseeing the entire mine reopening effort).
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Law Judge's suggestion that the mine operator might have some
secondary responsibility for the civil penalties assessed on the viola-
tions:
To give true meaning to the expressions of the Congress we con-
sider that the term "operator" must be read together with responsi-
bility for health and safety of employees (miners, workers). There-
fore, while more than one person may fall technically within the
definition of "operator," only the one responsible for the violations
and the safety of employees can be the person served with notices
and orders and against whom civil penalties may be assessed.'
The Board did explain that a mine operator under similar facts could
be deemed the responsible operator if it was demonstrated that the
operator encouraged or abetted the violations or effectively commit-
ted the violations by means of a principal-agent relationship.5
The reasoning set down in Affinity by the Board, and expanded
somewhat in later decisions, 6 set the stage for challenges by con-
tractors in federal court. Of particular note was a challenge initiated
by the Association of Bituminous Contractors (ABC).7 In that suit,
ABC sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court in
Washington, D.C. that independent construction contractors did not
fall within the definition of "operator" provided in the 1969 Coal
Act and, consequently, could not be held responsible for violations
of the Act. ABC also asked the court for an injunction barring ap-
plication of the statutory and regulatory requirements under the
1969 Coal Act to independent construction contractors After the
District Court granted the injunction, the D.C. Circuit reversed,
finding, like the Board in Affinity, that independent contractors were
also operators under the 1969 Coal Act. 9 Like the Board in Affinity,
I d. at 60; See also Wilson v. Laurel Shaft Constr. Co., I I.B.M.A. 217, 225
(1972) (finding independent construction contractor responsible as operator for its own
discriminatory conduct under the 1969 Coal Act).
5 Affinity Mining Co. 2 I.B.M.A. at 61.
6 See Peggs Run Coal Co., 5 I.B.M.A. 175, 182-83 (1975) (finding the mine
operator is liable for a contractor's violations in situation where employees of the mine
operator were endangered by the violation and the operator could have prevented the
violation with a minimum degree of diligence).
7 Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Morton, No. 74-1058 (D.D.C. May 23,
1975), rev'd, Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc., 581 F.2d at 855-56.
The court explained that the term "operator" included persons other than an
owner or lessee who operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine, and a "coal mine"
includes all shafts, slopes, tunnels, excavation and other property to be used in the work
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the circuit court noted the logic in making independent construction
contractors responsible for the safety and health of their own em-
ployees and work areas when their specific expertise and direct
supervision make them ideally suited to insure such safety and
health. The D.C. Circuit noted that:
[i]t is not a stretching of the statute to hold that companies who
profess to be as independent of the coal mine owners as these
construction companies purport to be, do control and supervise the
construction work they have contracted to perform over the area
where they are working. If a coal mine owner or lessee contracts
with an independent contracting company for a certain work with-
in a certain area involved in the mining operation, the supervision
that such a company exercises over that separate project clearly
brings it within the statute. Otherwise, the owner would be con-
stantly interfering in the work of the construction company in
order to minimize his own liability for damages. The Act does not
require such an inefficient method of ensuring compliance with
mandatory safety regulations."'
An earlier Fourth Circuit decision arising under the 1969 Coal
Act is also noteworthy in tracking the genesis of the application of
the term "operator." In this case, the court addressed citing the mine
operator along with the independent contractor for violations com-
mitted by independent service and construction contractors as op-
posed to only citing the independent contractor. In Bituminous Coal
Operators' Ass'n v. Secretary of Interior," the Fourth Circuit de-
termined not only that an independent construction or service con-
tractor was an "operator," and thus liable for violations by the
contractor's employees, but also determined the mine operator could
of extracting bituminous coal. Consequently, "operator" status does not require a compa-
ny to exercise control or supervision over an entire mine. Rather, the court ruled that an
independent contractor hired to do construction work at a mine is an operator with
respect to the work it performs and may be held responsible for violations of the Act it
commits. Andrus, 581 F.2d at 861.
'0 Id. at 862-63 (emphasis added).
" Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Secretary of Interior, 547 F.2d 240, 245
(4th Cir. 1977). The BCOA suit was directed at enjoining an Interior Department policy
instructing inspectors to issue citations for violations committed by an independent con-
struction contractor only to the operator who employed the contractor. The suit was filed
in federal district court in Virginia, seeking an injunction to prevent the Secretary from
enforcing the policy announced in Order No. 2977. The district court, in Bituminous
Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Hathaway, 406 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. Va. 1975) had declined to
issue the injunction finding that construction contractors were not "operators" and thus






B. Expanding the Field of Operators Under the Mine Act of 1977
In the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), Con-
gress attempted to put the independent contractor as operator issue
to rest by modifying the definition of operator to include "any own-
er, lessee, or other person who operates, controls or supervises a
coal or other mine or any independent contractor performing servic-
es or construction at such mine."'3 While this modification cleared
up the dispute regarding whether independent contractors could be
held liable for their own violations, it did nothing to address the
issue of who else could be held responsible for these violations and
when.
In an attempt to clarify the issue, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration promulgated regulations enabling, but not requiring,
independent contractors to obtain MSHA identification numbers. 4
The stated purpose of this regulation was "to facilitate MSHA's
enforcement policy of holding independent contractors responsible
for violations committed by them or their employees.""
MSHA's actual enforcement policy, however, reserved a great
deal more flexibility. To guide enforcement personnel through the
independent contractor morass, enforcement policy parameters were
established to assist in determining when certain "operators" could
or should be cited for violations by independent contractors. This
policy indicated that a production operator could be cited for inde-
pendent contractor violations:
(1) when the production-operator has contributed by either an act
or an omission to the occurrence of a violation in the course of an
independent contractor's work, or (2) when the production opera-
tor has contributed by either an act or omission to the continued
existence of a violation committed by an independent contractor,
or (3) when the production-operator's miners are exposed to the
"2 A similar decision interpreting the 1969 Coal Act was reached in 1979 by the
newly formed Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission in MSHA v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp., I F.M.S.H.R.C. 5 (1979). In Republic Steel the Review Commission
found among other things that a production operator could, but did not necessarily have
to, be deemed responsible for violations committed be an independent construction
contractor even if the production operator's employees were not exposed to the violative
conditions and the production operator could not have prevented the violation.
" 30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (1988).
30 C.F.R. §§ 45.1 to 45.6 (1994).
' 30 C.F.R. § 45.1 (1994).
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hazard, or (4) when the production-operator has control over the
condition that needs abatement. 6
This remains the effective enforcement policy of the Agency.
Initial case law arising under the Mine Act confirmed that
independent contractors were responsible as operators for their own
safety and health violations. These cases also confirmed that MSHA
had the discretion to cite either the independent contractor, the pro-
duction operator or both. 7 None of these early cases involved at-
tempts by MSHA to extend responsibility for safety violations be-
yond the entity which committed the violations or the entity con-
ducting the day-to-day operations at the mine.
This all began to change in 1987 in Utah Power & Light v.
Secretary of Labor.' In UP&L, MSHA attempted to hold a mine
lessee liable for violations committed by Emery Mining Corpora-
tion, its independent contract mine operator. MSHA argued that the
lessee was a "co-operator" with the contract mine operator and thus
either or both could be cited. The following factors were advanced
to support the Agency's argument:
1. UP&L was the lessee of the [mine]....
2. [UP&L purchased and owned the mining equipment]....
3. UP&L and [the contract mine operator] mutually agreed on
production goals....
4. UP&L had a resident engineer present at the mine on a daily
basis to make sure that UP&L's mining plan was followed....
5. [UP&L reviewed the contract mine operator's mine plans
" See MSHA Program Policy Manual, Vol. III, Part 45 at 6-7. This policy was
initially published in the Federal Register along with the independent contractor regula-
tions at 45 Fed. Reg. 44,494, 44,497.
'" See Secretary of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., I F.M.S.H.R.C. 1480, 1482
(1979), affd, No. 79-2367 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 1981); Cyprus Industrial Minerals Co. v.
F.M.S.H.R.C., 664 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Secretary of Labor v.
Phillips Uranium Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 549, 553 (1982) (MSHA can choose to assign
liability to production operator as well as construction contractor for construction
contractor's violations but the choice here was inconsistent with purposes of the Act
where construction contractors were specifically skilled in the specialized task they were
hired to perform and supervise and enforcement against the mine operator for
contractor's violations would not focus on the operator best able to avoid such viola-
tions). It is significant to note that these cases did not involve independent contractors
who operated the entire mine or who were production operators themselves. The inde-
pendent contractors in these cases were service and construction contractors.
" Utah Power & Light v. Secretary of Labor, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2028 (1987) (involv-
ing a petition by Utah Power and Light (UP&L) for interlocutory review of an order
issued by the administrative law judge denying UP&L's motion for summary judgment;
the petition was denied by the Commission).
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before they were submitted to MSHA for approval].' 9
In setting out these factors, MSHA asserted that assigning liability
to UP&L was appropriate because the "situation was directly analo-
gous to the relationship between a production operator and his inde-
pendent contractor."2 MSHA emphasized its belief that regardless
of whether the contract mine operator had day-to-day operational
control over the operation, it was always "subservient to UP&L
control of the mine."2 While ultimately, in this case, the Judge and
the Review Commission did not reach the co-operator issue22, this
theme and perspective on the relationship between contract mine
operators and the lessees or mine owners has continued to pervade
MSHA's recent efforts to extend liability beyond the contract mine
operator.
II. THE REMOTE OPERATOR CAN BE LIABLE
A. The W-P Decision
The Review Commission was recently presented with another
opportunity to address the "co-operator" issue in Secretary of Labor
v. W-P Coal Company.3 In this case MSHA cited W-P Coal Com-
pany, as lessee of the coal reserves, for violations committed by Top
Kat Mining, Inc., its contract mine operator. In initiating operations,
Top Kat obtained a mine identification number from MSHA and
identified itself as the operator of the mine. From that point, Top
Kat conducted the day-to-day operations of the mine pursuant to a
standard contract mining agreement with W-P Coal Company.24
" Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 339, 345-46 (1988)
(decision after remand).
" Id. at 349.
21 Id.
22 Administrative Law Judge Morris declined to rule on MSHA's co-operator
argument because UP&L had not been cited as an operator. Instead, MSHA initially had
cited UP&L only as a successor in interest because UP&L had taken over the operation
of the mine in the interim between the commission of the violations and the issuance of
the citations. The judge explained that the requirements of the Act had not been met
because MSHA did not issue a citation and civil penalty to UP&L directly as the
operator. Consequently, the judge confined his ruling to the successor-in-interest theory
asserted by the government. Id. at 350-353. However, the judge did note that, if true,
the facts relied on by the Secretary in support of its co-operator theory would generally
establish that UP&L was an operator of the mine. Id. at 352.
23 Secretary of Labor v. W-P Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1407 (1994) rev'g and
remanding, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 682 (1993).
24 The contract between W-P and Top Kat was "a standard industry form" in
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In 1991, Top Kat experienced financial difficulties and was
forced to cease operating the mine and go out of business. At the
time that Top Kat went out of business, there were over $200,000 in
outstanding civil penalties assessed against the company. In order to
obtain payment of these civil penalties, MSHA reissued each one of
these citations underlying the civil penalties to W-P as the "co-oper-
ator" of the mine. One citation was selected for a test case of this
wanted theory.
Administrative Law Judge Melick rejected MSHA's co-operator
theory explaining that "the term co-operator is not defined in the
Act ... and any liability on the part of W-P in this case must rest
upon a finding that there was an operator under section 3(d) of the
Act."'  Applying the principles set down in Old Ben and Phillips
Uranium, the judge found that "the Secretary has failed to establish
that he has proceeded against W-P in this case on anything other
than an administrative convenience in an attempt to collect civil
penalties from a 'deeper pocket.' '"26 In further asserting that W-P
was not the appropriate entity to proceed against, the judge noted:
Top Kat was clearly in charge of the day-to-day mining activities
and because only Top Kat had crews of working miners at the
mine during relevant times it may reasonably be inferred that it
was the primary contributor to the violative condition, that it was
in the best position to eliminate the hazard, and that it was best
prepared to prevent it from reoccurring. Finally, it was Top Kat's
employees who were primarily exposed to the cited hazard."
MSHA appealed Judge Melick's decision to the Review Corn-
which Top Kat assumed complete control of the mine, including hiring of miners and
the performance of safety and health obligations, in return for an agreed upon payment
per ton of coal produced. Secretary of Labor v. Top Kat Mining, Inc., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C.
682, 683 (1993). Additionally, the parties agreed that in the performance of the contract:
Contractors shall stay in a relationship with Owner as that of an indepen-
dent contractor and is in no manner a servant, agent, employee, sharehold-
er, joint venturer or partner of Owner, and that this Contract shall be
construed accordingly. Except as specified herein to the contract, Contractor
shall do the work required hereby according to its own manner and meth-
ods, without the right of direction or supervision by Owner and Owner
shall have the right to look to Contractor only for the results required and
to be accomplished hereunder.
Id. at 684.
Top Kat Mining, Inc., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 687 (acknowledging that, as a lessee,
W-P was an operator under section 3(d), the judge nonetheless determined that W-P was
not the appropriate entity to proceed against). Id. at 688.
26 Id. at 688.
27 id.
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mission. Moving away from its "co-operator" theory, MSHA fo-
cused instead on its position that the agency could appropriately cite
W-P as one of the two "operators" at the mine. In advancing its
case, MSHA expanded its argument regarding the level of contact
between the contract mine operator and the lessee or owner which is
necessary to justify citing the lessee or owner. In its brief the Secre-
tary asserted that:
Even if a party who is an owner operator under the Mine Act
chooses not to exercise significant control over the operation of its
mine, it should still remain a legitimate subject for enforcement
action liability under the Mine Act. The reason for this is obvious
- parties who have the legal power to exercise control over a
mine should be encouraged to actually exercise that power in
order to promote safety and health at the mine."
In its decision the Review Commission affirmed the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's rejection of MSHA's "co-operator" theory.
Nonetheless, the Review Commission reversed the administrative
law judge's finding that there was insufficient involvement in the
contract mine operator's operation to warrant citing W-P as an oper-
ator. The Review Commission explained:
[W]e conclude that substantial evidence does not support the
judge's conclusion that W-P was only superficially involved in
Top Kat's operation. Indeed many of the judge's factual findings
are inconsistent with that conclusion. The record reveals substan-
tial W-P involvement in the mine's engineering, financial, pro-
duction, personnel, and safety affairs. W-P prepared the mine
plan, calculated mine projections, prepared and updated mine
maps, contacted and visited the mine frequently to discuss pro-
duction and other matters, waived certain fees owed by Top Kat,
advanced funds to Top Kat, met with MSHA personnel regarding
mine conditions and enforcement activity, participated in an in-
spection of the mine, and even arranged and attended a meeting of
MSHA and Top Kat to discuss the increasing number of citations,
inspections and orders .... Thus, the record reveals that W-P was
sufficiently involved with the mine to support the Secretary's
decision to proceed against W-P.29
Given this conclusion, the Review Commission declined to address
the "passive liability" theory. The case was then remanded to the
Secretary's Brief at 33-34, Secretary of Labor v. Top Kat Mining, Inc., 15
F.M.S.H.R.C. 682 (1993).
Secretary of Labor v. W-P Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1407, 1411 (1994).
1995-961
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Judge to determine, among other things, whether citing W-P was
otherwise inappropriate because W-P was denied the normal proce-
dural rights due an operator (i.e., the right under section 3(f) of the
Mine Act to participate in inspections and investigations).
On remand, Judge Melick ruled that the failure to accord W-P
the section 3(f) rights did not bar MSHA from citing W-P because
W-P effectively waived this right when it failed to file a legal iden-
tity report identifying itself as a mine operator.3" The judge ex-
plained that "the rights accorded mine operators under section 3(f)
of the Act can only be provided to an entity if the Secretary is ap-
propriately informed through a legal identity report that he is in fact
the operator of the mine."3 The judge was not swayed by the argu-
ment that prior to this case, W-P was not on notice of any obliga-
tion, as a lessee, to file a legal identity report with MSHA 2
The judge's ruling regarding the appropriate civil penalty to be
assessed W-P was also interesting. Although the judge dismissed
MSHA's lack of prior enforcement against W-P or other mineral
rights holders or lessees as a basis for barring enforcement in this
case, he nonetheless then considered this fact and MSHA's failure to
enforce the legal identity reporting requirements as mitigating fac-
tors justifying a significant reduction of the civil penalty.33 The
judge resisted MSHA's coaxing to determine a civil penalty based
on Top Kat's individual circumstances.
MSHA argued that in calculating the civil penalty pursuant to
the six statutory criteria set down under section 1 10(i) that W-P's
negligence "should be based upon both its own negligence in con-
tracting with Top Kat and upon an imputation of Top Kat's negli-
gence., '34 The judge rejected this argument noting that there was no
30 Secretary of Labor v. W-P Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2405, 2409 (1994).
I' Id. at 2410.
32 In rejecting W-P's claim of lack of notice of MSHA's enforcement policy,
Judge Melick cited the fact that the Review Commission had, several years earlier in its
1979 Republic Steel decision, announced that "a 'mine operator cannot be allowed to
exonerate itself from its statutory responsibility for the safety and health of miners
merely by establishing a private contractual relationship in which miners are not its
employees and the ability to control the safety of its workplace is restricted."' Id. at
2408 (quoting Secretary of Labor v. Republic Steel, I F.M.S.H.R.C. 5, 11 (1979)).
Again, this analysis sidesteps the fact that the type of contractor being discussed and
envisioned in Republic Steel was a service and construction contractor whose ability to
control the safety and health of its workplace can, in that they do not have control over
the entire mine, be somewhat restricted. That is not necessarily the case with a contract
mine operator.
" Id at 2414-15.
14 Id. at 2414.
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evidence that W-P was aware of, or even if Top Kat had, a prior
bad history of safety and health violations. Consequently, he de-
clined to find that W-P was negligent in contracting with Top
Kat.3" The judge similarly rejected MSHA's contention that W-P
was negligent in not intervening when it became apparent that Top
Kat was having safety compliance problems. He noted that one of
the very factors that MSHA had cited in making its "co-operator"
argument - that W-P had met with MSHA to assist Top Kat with
its safety problems - dispelled the assertion that W-P stayed on the
sidelines.36
Of significant note is the fact that the judge rejected an alterna-
tive theory, advanced by MSHA for the first time in the remand
proceeding, that Top Kat's negligence should be imputed to W-P
because Top Kat was W-P's agent. The judge refused to consider
this agency theory because it was not advanced until such a late
stage in the proceedings. 7 Nonetheless, the door was left open for
this argument to be made again.
Although W-P's petition for discretionary review of Judge
Melick's decision on remand was granted by the Review Commis-
sion, the parties recently negotiated a settlement. Consequently, the
appeal was withdrawn and the proceedings were dismissed.3"
B. Passive vs. Substantial Participation
It will probably not be long before the Review Commission has
another opportunity to address the issues dealt with in W-P Coal.
Two cases currently pending before Administrative Law Judge Da-
vid Barbour raise many of the same problems. In Southern Min-
erals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,39 MSHA seeks to hold Southern
Minerals, Inc. and True Energy Coal Sales, Inc. jointly and severally
liable for alleged violations committed by their contract mine opera-
tor, Fire Creek, Inc. These violations were cited in conjunction with
an investigation of a fatal underground mine explosion.' In re-
sponse, the companies argue that they were "passive" entities who




3s W-P Coal Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1526 (1995).
3 Southern Minerals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 465 (1995).
o The case involved 102 contests of citations and orders with accompanying civil
penalties totaling $576,681. Id.
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them under the statute as "operators."'" The judge considered and
denied cross motions for summary decision on the issue of whether
Southern Minerals and True Energy could, given the extent of their
control and supervision, properly be held liable under the Mine Act
for the contract mine operator's violations.42
The judge examined the definition of operator at section 3(d)
of the Mine Act43 and determined that enforcement against South-
ern Minerals and True Energy would, in fact, only be appropriate if
they exercised some level of "control or supervision" over the mine.
The judge asserted that "it is not correct to read the definition [of
operator] as to make owners or lessees operators in and of them-
selves. '' " The judge further explained:
I agree with the Contestants that a purely "passive entity" would
not meet the statutory definition of "operator" under the Act,
provided the entity did not reserve to itself authority to control
mining operations or to control the mine itself. In other words, in
a contract mining situation, an entity that leased mineral rights and
contracted with another entity to mine coal would subject itself to
Mine Act liability if it made decisions with respect to how coal
would be mined and how the mine would be staffed and run or if
it had the actual authority to make such decisions. It would not be
enough, however, to simply establish the potential for control, for
example, by establishing interlocking corporate relationships be-
tween parties and the normal business transactions attendant there-
to.,
I d. at 470. The general relationship among Southern Minerals, True Energy and
Fire Creek was essentially as follows: All three companies shared common ownership,
had some common officers, and had identical membership on their respective boards of
directors. Southern Minerals, which has no employees, leased property from an unrelated
third party and engaged Fire Creek as a contract miner on the property. Southern
Minerals also loaned Fire Creek funds to purchase mining equipment and occasionally to
cover operating expenses. The coal mined by Fire Creek was sold by Southern Minerals
to True Energy, which had the coal processed by another unrelated third party and sold
the coal. True Energy provided a number of administrative services to Fire Creek such
as handling Fire Creek's business and financial records, maintaining payroll and person-
nel files, monitoring workers' compensation, medical insurance and other employee
benefits. True Energy also provided technical services to Fire Creek (surveying, spad set-
ting, map preparation and certification) for which Fire Creek paid. Id. at 467-69.
I d. at 480.
43 As set out earlier, section 3(d) defines "operator" as "any owner, lessee, or other
person who operates, controls, or supervises a . . .mine or any independent contractor
performing services or construction at such mine." 30 U.S.C. § 802(d).
" Southern Minerals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 471.
4 Id. at 472. The judge explained that this interpretation "support[ed] and
strengthen[ed]" the Act because "[iut makes no sense within this context to place liability
[VOL. 1 1: 1
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Consequently, the Judge set out to determine if Southern Minerals
and True Energy had sufficient involvement in the day-to-day oper-
ations of the mine. Although the judge ultimately determined that
there were insufficient undisputed material facts with which to
gauge the level of actual participation and/or authority to participate
one way or the other, the judge's consideration of the factors relied
upon by the Review Commission in W-P Coal (i.e. involvement in
the mine's engineering, financial, production, personnel and safety
affairs) is instructive in evaluating what MSHA must demonstrate in
order to extend liability.
For instance, with respect to engineering, the judge found that
Southern Minerals obtained permits, met with MSHA to discuss
changes in MSHA Policy affecting the mine's ventilation plans, and
retained the power to approve mine plans for the purpose of coordi-
nating the overall mining operations located on Southern Mineral's
leasehold property. True Energy provided surveying and spad setting
services, and prepared and certified Fire Creek's mine maps. The
judge held that these factors were not indicia of control over the
mine without some additional evidence of how these factors resulted
in actual authority to control mining.'
Concerning financial involvement, the judge noted that the
provision of funds from Southern Minerals and True Energy to Fire
Creek to purchase equipment and pay operating expenses was also
not determinative unless MSHA could demonstrate that this finan-
cial leverage was used to control the mine.47 Similarly, with respect
to production, the judge found the fact that the individual president
of both Southern Minerals and True Energy frequently met with the
president of Fire Creek to discuss mining matters also insufficient to
warrant liability unless there were specific directives about how and
where to mine.'
The judge's review of the personnel and administrative involve-
ment was consistent. The judge noted that requests by Fire Creek
for advice regarding hiring and firing decisions and the provision by
True Energy of various administrative services on behalf of Fire
on those who have not participated in creating the conditions in a mine or who have no
actual control over and responsibility for those conditions." Id. at 471-72.
' With respect to the spad setting, surveying, and map preparation work conducted
by True Energy the judge noted that such work is frequently contracted out and, while
it is conceivable control over a mine could be exerted through such service, there must
be evidence of such control or intent to control. Id. at 479.
4 Id. at 475, 478, 479.
Id. at 476.
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Creek, without a demonstration by MSHA that such advice and
services resulted in control over how mining was conducted, were
insufficient to make Southern Minerals or True Energy the opera-
tor.49
A hearing was held in Southern Minerals on May 2, 1995, and,
as of this writing, a decision is still pending. One reason for the
delay could be that the judge is confronted with a similar set of
issues in Berwind Natural Resources, Corp., et al. v. Secretary of
Labor."
In Berwind, MSHA issued 225 citations and orders for alleged
violations arising out of a fatal explosion at an underground mine
operated by a contract mine operator, AA&W Coals, Inc. The cita-
tions were issued to AA&W, Kyber Coal Co., from whom AA&W
contracted to run the mine, Jesse Branch Coal Company and Ken-
tucky Berwind Land Company, two of Kyber's sister corporations,
and Berwind Natural Resources Corporation, the corporate parent.
As in Southern Minerals, the parties in Berwind filed motions
for summary decision contesting the Berwind Companies status as
operators. In his ruling, Judge Barbour again focused on evidence of
actual participation and authority to participate in the operation of
the mine. However, his ruling did add a slight variable which was
not emphasized in the Southern Minerals ruling. The judge ex-
plained that simply demonstrating participation or authority to par-
ticipate is not enough, rather
in order to establish that an entity is an "operator" subject to the
Act, the Secretary must prove that the entity, either directly or
indirectly, substantially participated in the operation, control or
supervision of the day-to-day operations of the mine, or had the
authority to do so.
With this stated, the judge then examined the level of control
and supervision exercised by the parties through involvement in the
engineering, financial, production and employment functions at the
mine. Through this analysis, the judge determined that, while the
41 Id. at 477-79.
o Berwind Natural Resources Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 684
(1995).
' Id. at 705. The judge stated that he interpreted the Review Commission's deter-
mination in W-P Coal that W-P's "substantial" and "considerable" involvement warranted
MSHA's enforcement actions, as implicitly recognizing "that an entity's involvement in
the day to day operation of a mine could be so infrequent or minimal, i.e., so insub-
stantial or inconsiderable, that operator status would not result." Id.
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undisputed material facts were insufficient to discern whether or not
Kyber or Kentucky Berwind substantially participated in the control
and supervision of the day-to-day operations of the mine, Jesse
Branch and Berwind clearly did not and, consequently, were not
operators subject to enforcement under the Act.
With respect to Jesse Branch, the judge rejected MSHA's con-
tention that Jesse Branch's provision of map drafting, surveying,
and spad setting services to the contract mine operator was an indi-
cation of substantial control.52 The judge noted that the contracting
of such services in the industry was not unusual. Similarly, the
judge found that quarterly inspections of the mine's drainage ponds
for compliance with state environmental regulations was "simply too
remote from statutory control and supervision and too infrequent to
vest Jesse Branch with operator status."53 Finally, the judge refused
to draw an inference from the fact that Kyber, the contracting com-
pany, and Jesse Branch shared officers, equipment and office
space.54
In rejecting MSHA's designation of Berwind as an operator,
the judge saw no indicia of control in the fact that Berwind person-
nel developed the contract which was entered into between Kyber
and the contract mine operator, Berwind had the authority to reject
prospective contract mine operators and was advised of AA&W's
selection, and that Berwind received weekly reports regarding pro-
duction and issues at the mine.55 The judge found that this involve-
ment was "a long way from substantial participation in the control
and supervision of day-to-day operations that is contemplated by the
Act.
5 6
With respect to Kyber and Kentucky Berwind, the judge reject-
ed MSHA's contention that the very nature of contract mining
would place an entity like Kyber, the contracting party, or an entity
like Kentucky Berwind, the owner and lessee of the mineral rights,
in the position of being an operator."
52 Id. at 711, 712.
i Id. at 711-12.
5 Id.
" Id. at 715.
Id. at 715-16. The judge noted that if he held Berwind liable he would be
"ruling effectively that Berwind was an operator by nature of its corporate structure and
corporate relationship to the other Contestants," which would "fall outside the letter of
Section 3(d) [of the Mine Act]." Id. at 716.
"' In this regard, the judge rejected the following as indicia of operator status:
performance of preliminary face-up work at the mine, obtaining and updating federal
environmental permits, paying mine permit fees and posting a required bond, payment of
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The judge did assign significance to Kyber's preparation of the
mining projections for the mine, pursuant to the lease from Ken-
tucky Berwind, and the impact on day-to-day operations. The judge
implied that this function would not be an indication of operator
status if, as the Contestants claimed, the projections were simply a
means to make sure that the coal that was mined was the coal that
was leased and that it met customer quality specifications." How-
ever, the implication was the opposite if the projections were, as
MSHA claimed, "a means to dictate to [the contract mine operator]
that mining be done in a certain area or in a certain way."59
The judge also emphasized that the production requirements in
the contract could cut either way. If tonnage requirements were used
to force AA&W to adopt a particular work schedule, that would
indicate an element of operator-type control as opposed to a simple
request from a lessee which could be denied.'
A hearing was held on June 26, 1995, to obtain additional
evidence regarding Kyber and Kentucky Berwind's level of partici-
pation. As of this writing, a decision has not been issued. 61 Wheth-
er the Review Commission will adopt the "substantial participation"
framework remains to be seen. One thing is sure, however: with
Berwind, Southern Minerals and a number of other cases on the
horizon, there will be no shortage of opportunities for the Review
Commission to continue filling in pieces of this puzzle.
taxes (reimbursed through deduction from the price per ton of coal paid to AA&W),
requiring that mining be done by conventional mining (consistent with the production
and processing requirements for stoker coal), occasional inspections of the mine (to
determine that coal being mined with parameters of lease), and the right of Kentucky
Berwind to terminate the lease if it was not being complied with. Id. at 706-10, 712-15.
" Id. at 707.
5 Id.
60 Id. at 709.
6' As this article was going to press, the decision in Berwind was issued.
Berwind Natural Resources Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, No. KENT 94-574-R
(F.M.S.H.R.C. Feb. 23, 1996). The judge ruled that, in fact, Kyber Coal Co. kept
ultimate control over the mine by maintaining bottom line authority for determining
mining direction. The judge determined that "[in dictating the course mining had to take
and in having the authority to dictate that course Kyber denied AA&W autonomy of
action within the overall constraints of the projections." Id. at 38. The judge explained
that an "owner or lessee of mineral rights cannot deny its responsibility for the actions
of its contract operator, when the contract operator is not free to choose the course of
mining it believes best in this regard." Id.
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III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH BY MSHA
In the meantime, MSHA has in the past few months attempted
to take a less confrontational approach to achieving its goal of mak-
ing lessees and owners more responsible for, and more involved in,
the safety of their contracted out mines. MSHA has negotiated, and
continues to negotiate, agreements with companies in which those
companies commit to taking an active and substantive role in safety
at their contract mines. As consideration for this commitment,
MSHA has agreed not to cite these companies as operators responsi-
ble for violations at these mines.
The requirements for fulfilling this commitment are interesting.
For instance, in the "Production Contractor Safety Promotion Pro-
gram"'62 negotiated with United Coal Company, United has agreed
that in selecting prospective contract mine operators, it will review
those operators' accident and injury frequency rates and violation
history. Further, United will require that prior to commencement of
the operation of the mine, each contract mine operator has employed
the necessary certified persons to conduct the required pre-shift, on-
shift and weekly examinations; that the contractor's employees have
been fully trained; and that the contractor has paid all outstanding
civil penalties in full.
United also agrees to perform a quarterly audit of the contract
mine operator to evaluate contractor safety performance and follow
it up with a specific training session to discuss the findings of the
audit and recommend possible action to address these findings. As
requested by MSHA, United will also make reasonable efforts to
attend closeout conferences following MSHA inspections of the
mine, and to specifically review and address the circumstances
surrounding closure orders issued at the mine.
United has also committed to provide each contract mine oper-
ator, and as appropriate, its supervisors and employees, with state
and federal safety compliance training, certified person training and
training regarding the proper performance of pre-shift, on-shift and
weekly examinations. United will provide technical assistance to the
contract mine operator in the preparation of initial and revised mine
plans such as roof control, ventilation, and training plans.
To assist United in this process, MSHA has agreed to regularly
provide specific information to United to keep United apprised of
62 United Coal Company's Production Contractor Safety Promotion Program,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH NEws, May 19, 1995, at D-127 to D-135.
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the safety situation at the mine.63
While these contract mine operator pacts may eliminate the
types of disputes currently being litigated before the Review Com-
mission, only time will tell whether this partnership framework will
simply produce another set of problems. Specifically, there is a real
danger that in becoming more involved in the details of how the
contract mine operator performs its safety obligation, the potential
for destroying the independence of the contractor will increase. This
could expose the owner or lessee to liability for injuries experienced
by the contract mine operator's employees.'
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS
With the amount of litigation surrounding this new enforcement
policy by MSHA it will be very difficult for owners and lessees in
the future to assert that they had no notice that they could be con-
sidered operators. Nonetheless, given the unanswered questions
regarding where to draw the line between passive participation and
substantial participation, it is probably premature for lessees and
owners to run to the nearest MSHA office and complete a legal
identity form. However, if functions like preparing mining projec-
tions and monitoring production and lease requirements (standard
features of most contract mining agreements) become indicators of
operator status, at the very least, a significant modification of how
contract mine agreements are administered may be necessary.
It is important to note that, to date, MSHA has only chosen to
enforce this new policy against owners and lessees in circumstances
in which there has either been a serious mining accident or in which
the contract mining company has amassed significant unpaid civil
penalties. Balancing this with the fact that owners and lessees in-
crease the opportunity for third party liability exposure if they as-
sume the type of involvement in day-to-day operations that MSHA
wants them to assume, there are several precautionary steps which
companies can take to try to address these competing forces:
' MSHA will provide United with detailed violation history reports, accident/injury
data, notice of deadlines for submitting required plans, notice of all closeout conferences,
notice of the initiation and conclusion of 105(c) discrimination investigations, notice,
upon request, regarding the status of civil penalty payments, and the provision of copies
of all citations, orders, and modifications issued at the mine. Id.
" This, in turn, could present a significant problem given the fact that owners and
lessees are not necessarily protected by the worker's compensation provided to the
contract mine operator's employees.
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1. Utilize contractors with a good safety record who can be
relied upon to perform safely.
2. Utilize contractors with financial resources sufficient to
cover federal enforcement liability.
3. Contractually obligate the contractor to comply with appli-
cable safety and health standards and monitor that compliance
through FOIA requests to MSHA.
4. Avoid direct supervision of the contractor's personnel re-
garding safety and production efforts. Contacts of this nature
should be made to appropriate contract management personnel
and communicated in terms of requests for contract compli-
ance.
5. To the extent possible, owners and lessees should keep
their activities separate from the activities of the contract min-
er.
All companies should remain focused on the continuing devel-
opment of this issue. As more and different fact patterns are ruled
on, a clearer understanding of where "operator" status begins and
ends will begin to emerge.
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